Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
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Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points by Oliver D. Hart

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Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Mass .
Written in English

Subjects:

  • Commerce -- Econometric models

Book details:

About the Edition

We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A rigid contract fixing price works well in normal times since there is nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is exceptional, one party will hold up the other , damaging the relationship and causing deadweight losses as parties withhold cooperation. We show that a judicious allocation of asset ownership can help by reducing the incentives to engage in hold up. In contrast to the literature, the driving force in our model is payoff uncertainty rather than noncontractible investments.

Edition Notes

StatementOliver Hart.
SeriesNBER working paper series -- no. 13540., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13540.
ContributionsNational Bureau of Economic Research.
The Physical Object
Pagination42 p. :
Number of Pages42
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL17635962M
OCLC/WorldCa181655590

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  Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points * Oliver Hart. Oliver Hart Harvard University. Search for other works by this author on: Oliver Hart, Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume , Issue 1, February , Cited by: HOLD-UP, ASSET OWNERSHIP, AND REFERENCE POINTS One aspect of our approach is that, in contrast to much of the literature, it focuses on ex post, rather than ex ante, inefficiencies. Indeed, (noncontractible) relationship-specific investments play.   Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points. NBER Working Paper No. w 43 Pages Posted: 24 Oct Last revised: 2 Jul See all articles by Oliver Hart However, when value or cost is exceptional, one party will hold up the other, damaging the relationship and causing deadweight losses as parties withhold cooperation. We show Cited by: Hart, Oliver. “Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points.” Quarterly Journal of Economics (1): Cited by:

Oliver Hart, "Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. (1), pages Handle. Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points-super-* Article in Quarterly Journal of Economics (1) January with 23 Reads How we measure 'reads'. Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points by Oliver Hart* April *Harvard University. I am grateful to John Moore for discussions on some of the elements of this paper, to Mathias Dewatripont and Bob Gibbons for helpful comments, and to Georgy Egorov for excellent research assistance. Financial support from the U. S. National Science. Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points by Oliver Hart* April [revised, March ] *Harvard University. I am grateful to John Moore for discussions on some of the elements of this paper, and to Bob Gibbons and Birger Wernerfelt for many helpful conversations. I would.

  On Ma I presented my paper titled Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points in the Law, Economics, and Organization Seminar here at the Law School.. This paper studies two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. Get this from a library! Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points. [Oliver Hart] -- We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A rigid contract fixing price works well in normal times since there is nothing to argue. BibTeX @MISC{Hart07hold-up,asset, author = {Oliver Hart}, title = {Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Point}, year = {}}. Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points Oliver Hart NBER Working Paper No. October JEL No. D23,D86,K12 ABSTRACT We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A rigid contract fixing price works well in normal times since there is nothing to argue about.